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III. — *The Crastinus Episode at Palaeopharsalus.*

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THIS episode is told by Caesar himself as follows (B.C. iii. 91): "Erat Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione x duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hic signo dato, 'Sequimini me,' inquit, 'manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. Unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus.' Simul, respiciens Caesarem, 'Faciam,' inquit, 'hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas.' Haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit, atque eum electi milites circiter cxx voluntarii eiusdem centuriae sunt prosecuti."

Whatever this deed of Crastinus was, it certainly received Caesar's heartiest approval, for he says, in stating his losses (c. 99. 2, 3): "Interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. Neque id fuit falsum, quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. Sic enim Caesar existimabat, eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse, optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat."

Caesar's object in giving the Crastinus episode seems to have been, judging from the immediate context,¹ an illustration of the fiery zeal of his soldiers. Consequently he leaves us quite in the dark as to the precise nature, from a military standpoint, of the exploit which wins such praise from him, and subsequent writers throw no light upon it.

Lucan (Phars. vii. 470-473) makes Crastinus hurl the first weapon, shed the first blood, and so break the spell under

¹ Cf. c. 90, *fin.*: "Hac habita oratione exposcentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit."

which the opposing armies stand when they realize the horrors which must follow their onset :

“Di tibi non mortem, quae cunctis poena paratur,
sed sensum post fata tuae dent, Crastine, morti,
cuius torta manu commisit lancea bellum,
primaque Thessaliam Romano sanguine tinxit.”

Florus also (ii. 13 [= iv. 2], 46), who probably gives the general impression of the whole episode which he got from Livy, makes Crastinus open the battle, and considers the strangeness of the wound of which he died significant of the frenzy with which he fought : “Adnotatum quoque committentis aciem Crastini pilum, qui mox adacto in os gladio, sic inter cadavera repertus est ; libidinem ac rabiem qua pugnaverat ipsa novitate volneris praeferebat.”

Plutarch gives two distinct accounts of the episode, an earlier one in Caes. 44, a later one in Pomp. 71. These may be put side by side for closer comparison : —

CAES. 44.

... Αὐτὸς δὲ κινεῖν τὴν φάλαγγα μέλλων καὶ προῖν ἐπ' ἔργον ἤδη πρῶτον ὄρᾳ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν ἄνδρα πιστὸν αὐτῷ καὶ πολέμων ἔμπειρον ἐπιθαρσύνοντα τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῷ καὶ προκαλούμενον εἰς ἄμιλλαν ἀλκῆς. Τοῦτον ὀνομαστὶ προσαγορεύσας, “Τί ἐλπίζομεν,” εἶπεν, “ὦ Γάϊε Κρασσίνιε, καὶ πῶς τι θάρσους ἔχομεν;” Ὁ δὲ Κρασσίνιος ἐκτείνας τὴν δεξιὰν καὶ μέγα βοήσας, “Νικήσομεν,” ἔφη, “λαμπρῶς, ὦ Καῖσαρ· ἐμὲ δὲ ἡ ζῶντα τήμερον ἢ τεθνηκότα ἔπαινέσεις.” Ταῦτα εἰπὼν πρῶτος ἐμβάλλει τοῖς πολέμοις δρόμῳ, συνεπισπασάμενος τοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι στρατιώτας. Διακόψας δὲ τοὺς πρῶτους καὶ πρὸς χωρῶν φόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ βιαζόμενος ἀνακόπτεται ξίφει πληγαῖς διὰ τοῦ στόματος, ὥστε καὶ τὴν αἰχμὴν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἵνλον ἀνασχέιν.

POMP. 71.

‘Ὡς δ’ οὖν τὸ Φαρσάλιον πεδίον ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὅπλων ἀνεπέπληστο καὶ μάχης ἤρθη παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων σημεία, πρῶτος ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος φάλαγγος ἐξέδραμε Γάϊος Κρασσιανός, ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι λοχαγῶν, μεγάλην ἀποδιδοὺς ὑπόσχεσιν Καίσαρι. Πρῶτον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐξίων τοῦ χάρακος εἶδε καὶ προσαγορεύσας ἤρετο, πῶς φρονοίη περὶ τῆς μάχης. Ὁ δὲ τὴν δεξιὰν προτείνας ἀνεβόησε, “Νικήσεις λαμπρῶς, ὦ Καῖσαρ· ἐμὲ δὲ ἡ ζῶντα τήμερον ἢ νεκρὸν ἐπαινέσεις.” Τοῦτων τῶν λόγων μεμνημένος ἐξάρμησε καὶ συνεπείσπασατο πολλοὺς καὶ προσέβαλε κατὰ μέσους τοὺς πολέμους. Γενομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀγῶνος εὐθύς ἐν ξίφεσι καὶ πολλῶν φονευομένων, βιαζόμενον πρὸς καὶ διακόπτοντα τοὺς πρῶτους ὑποστάς τις ὥθει διὰ τοῦ στόματος τὸ ξίφος, ὥστε τὴν αἰχμὴν περάσασαν ἀνασχέιν κατὰ τὸ ἵνλον.

The essential identity of these two accounts must be seen at once. The variation of the second from the first is no greater than a writer with Plutarch's aims would freely allow

himself in rewriting the episode, possibly from memory, or from brief notes and collections. The name of the veteran is Gaius Krassianus in the second version, Gaius Krassinius in the first. The colloquy between him and Caesar takes place as they are leaving the camp, according to the second version; but according to the first, just before the order to charge upon the enemy is given. In both versions the colloquy is virtually the same, in both Crastinus is commander of a hundred and twenty men, and in both his charge and death are described in the same way. The two versions are, moreover, of the same length. Indeed chapters 44-72 in the Pompeius, comprising the account of the first triumvirate and of the civil war down to the battle of Palaepharsalus, are not essentially different in spirit or incident from the account of the same period in the Caesar.¹

Nor are the variations of Plutarch's first version from that of Caesar himself worthy of any emphasis. Plutarch makes the colloquy between Caesar and Crastinus occur just before the battle signal is given; Caesar says nothing of any appeal of his own to Crastinus, and makes the latter's speech to his comrades and vow to his general follow the battle signal. On the other hand, Plutarch's *ἐπιθαρσύνοντα τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῷ καὶ προκαλούμενον εἰς ἄμειλλαν ἀλκῆς* may very well represent Caesar's "*Sequimini me, manipulares mei qui fuistis,*" etc., the vow which the veteran makes his general is practically the same in Plutarch and in Caesar, and the general features of the charge and death of Crastinus are the same in both. Plutarch's addition of Caesar's address and question to Crastinus,—the *τί ἐλπίζομεν, ὦ Γαῖε Κρασσίνιε, καὶ πῶς τι θάρσους ἔχομεν*; of the earlier version, and the indirect *πῶς φρονοίη περὶ τῆς μάχης* of the later, — together with the corresponding answer of Crastinus to the question, — the *Νικήσομεν (Νικήσεις) λαμπρῶς, ὦ Καῖσαρ*, — may be embellishments of Plutarch's own, or items which he found in the account given by Asinius Pollio, to which he at least had access, if he did not make it his sole authority.²

¹ Cf. H. Peter, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Römer* (Halle, 1865), pp. 117, 118.

² H. Peter, *ibid.*, pp. 123-126.

The fact is worthy of emphasis, however, that Plutarch, with a probable command of that Pollio who was an eyewitness of the battle and a censor of certain inexactnesses in Caesar's Commentaries,¹ makes Crastinus commander of a troop of one hundred and twenty men. This fact ought to be decisive against Göler's arbitrary alteration of Caesar's words, and therefore against his explanation of the whole episode, resting so largely as this does upon his reconstructed text.²

To these accounts of the Crastinus episode may be added, more to make the list complete than for any new features which it gives us, that of Appian (Bell. Civ. ii. 82): *Τοῦτο τέλος ἦν τῆς αὐιδίμου περὶ Φάρσαλον μάχης. Ἀριστεία δ' ὁ μὲν Καῖσαρ αὐτὸς καὶ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα ἐκ πάντων ἐφέρετο, ὁμολογούμενος ἀριστεύσαι, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τὸ τέλος τὸ δέκατον· τὰ δὲ τρίτα Κρασσίνιος λοχαγός, ὃν Καῖσαρ μὲν ἐξίων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην ἤρετο ὃ τι προσδοκῆ, ὃ δὲ λαμπρῶς ἀνεβόησε, "Νικήσομεν, ὦ Καῖσαρ, καὶ μὲν τήμερον ἢ ζῶντα ἢ νεκρὸν ἀποδέξῃ."* *Ἡ στρατιὰ δ' ἐμαρτύρει, καθάπερ ἔνθουν ἐς ἐκάστην τάξιν μεταθέοντα πολλὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ δρᾶσαι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ζητούμενος ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἠρέθη, τὰ ἀριστεία ὁ Καῖσαρ αὐτῷ περιέθηκε καὶ συνέθαψε, καὶ τάφον ἐξαίρετον ἀνέστησεν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολυανδρίου.* Peculiar to this version of the episode are the repeated stress laid on the *ἀριστεία* or prizes of valor in the battle, the complete indefiniteness in describing the actual exploit of Crastinus, and the statement that he received separate burial. The version otherwise agrees minutely with the first of Plutarch, so minutely as to justify the belief, strengthened by many verbal coincidences elsewhere,³ that the two historians took the episode from a common source, probably Pollio.⁴

It must be confessed now that we have not the necessary

¹ The *locus classicus* is Suet. D. Iul. 56.

² Caesar's Gallischer Krieg und Theile seines Bürgerkriegs,² ii. p. 176.

³ Cf. H. Peter, *ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴ That Appian did not use Plutarch is shown by Wijnne, *De Fide et Auctoritate Appiani* (Groningae, 1855), p. 53 f.; and by Wichmann, *De Plutarchi in Vitis Bruti et Antonii Fontibus* (Diss. Bonn., 1874), p. 9. Thouret, in *Leipzig Stud.*, i. p. 333 ff., argues that neither Appian nor Plutarch used Pollio directly, but a Greek excerpt of his history of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar. This view is controverted by Basiner, *Quaestiones Caesarianae* (Diss. Dorpat., 1883), Pars I. p. 5 ff.

data for deciding definitely upon all the variations in these different accounts, but, remembering that in their general features all the accounts substantially agree, we may consider the following as the most probable outline-sketch of the Crastinus episode. On leaving the camp Caesar hailed a certain centurion, Crastinus by name, and asked what he thought of the prospects. Crastinus replied, "We shall conquer gloriously, Caesar, and to-day, alive or dead, I shall win your praise." Just as Caesar gave the battle signal, therefore, Crastinus made a stirring appeal to his fellow soldiers, charged foremost upon the enemy, followed by a large company, and died in the thick of the fight, with a sword run through his mouth and neck.

It is not improbable that Caesar, in his own account of the affair, whether consciously or not, transposed the centurion's vow from the colloquy at the leaving of the camp (which he does not give at all), and joined it to the appeal to the soldiers just after the battle signal (which appeal he alone gives in full) ; while Plutarch, finding the colloquy in Pollio put at its proper time, and wishing possibly to unite the details given by Pollio and Caesar,¹ did so in his first version by transferring both colloquy and vow, as given by Pollio, from the time of leaving the camp to the moment before the charge, and by making the hortatory speech of Crastinus, as given by Caesar, the immediate occasion of the colloquy, but returned in his second version to the chronology of Pollio, omitting all notice whatever of the hortatory speech. Still, however much might be said in support of this view, the conclusion, from the nature of the evidence, can never be a certain one.

To this outline-sketch of the episode, uniting the main features of all the accounts, I wish to add several specific features, which may fairly be deduced from Caesar's words, but about which there has been either uncertainty, vague statement, or wide diversity of opinion.²

¹ It is highly improbable that Plutarch did not at least consult the Commentaries of Caesar, whether he made them his chief authority or not.

² Cf. Rüstow, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung Caesars*² (Nordhausen, 1862), p. 30; Göler, *op. cit.* ii. p. 176 f.; Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, ii. p. 376;

Caesar told the episode, as has already been said, merely to illustrate the spirit which filled his troops, and did not try to describe just what Crastinus was, just what commission he had received, or just what his exploit actually was; and yet all these points can be decided by a careful study of Caesar's words.

I. What was Crastinus?

"Erat Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris"; — there was, in the army of Caesar thus sent by the battle signal against the enemy, Crastinus, an *evocatus*. The distinction between the three classes of veteran soldiers, *beneficiarii*, *evocati*, and *voluntarii*, has been stated by no one better than by Göler.¹ All soldiers who had seen service, whether their time was up or not, were called *veterani*, in distinction from *tirones*, or raw recruits. All veteran soldiers were *beneficiarii*, if they enjoyed any special privileges or immunities in the service. Of the *beneficiarii* whose terms had expired, those who had accepted lands as a special reward for service could be called out (*evocati*) for new campaigns, and were under obligations to answer the call; those who did not receive such lands, when called anew into service could respond to the call or not, and if they did, were *voluntarii*. The *voluntarii*, then, were a special class of *evocati*. A *voluntarius* was an *evocatus*, but not every *evocatus* was a *voluntarius*.

When Caesar began his military career in Gaul, Pompey was already a general of many and long campaigns, and the matter of lands to give his veteran soldiers was important enough to become a political question. He was not then so vain, after all, when he boasted, just before the outbreak of the civil war, that wherever in Italy he should stamp upon the ground, armies would rise up for him (Plut. Pomp. 57, *fin.*). Caesar says (B. C. i. 3. 2): "Multi undique ex veteribus

the Kraner-Hofmann edition of Caesar's Civil War, *ad loc.*; Johannes Schmidt, *Hermes*, xiv. pp. 332 f., 348; Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, iii. p. 513 f.; Merivale, *History of the Romans*, ii. p. 232; Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. p. 205; Willmann, *Adnotationes quaedam ad C. Julii Caesaris Relationem Pugnæ Pharsalicae* (Halberstadii, 1875), p. 6 f. The statements of Rüstow are by far the most satisfactory.

¹ *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 237 f.

Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, . . . completur urbs veteranis,¹ comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis." At the battle of Palaepharsalus, according to the same authority, Pompey's *evocati* numbered about two thousand (B. C. iii. 88. 5) : "Haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficiariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant ; quae tota acie disperserat." So numerous were they that Pompey hoped to give firmness to his line by stationing them along its whole length. Caesar's military career, on the other hand, had not been long enough for the growth of any large body of *evocati*, if of any, in the strictest sense of the word. His men were all veterans, but there had been no interval in his campaigns during which they could enjoy farms and homes. He may well have had, however, *voluntarii*, veterans whose terms of service had expired, but who, without going home to enjoy their rewards, accepted of their own accord their general's invitation to remain in his service. Such an *evocatus* was Crastinus, and Caesar uses this word instead of *voluntarius*, either because he felt no need of making the distinction with the purpose which he had in mind in relating the episode, or because *evocatus* was more freely used in the singular than *voluntarius*.²

2. What commission had Crastinus received ?

The year before he had been *primipilus* in the tenth legion, i. e. head centurion of Caesar's pet legion, the one which was now stationed on the right wing, over against Pompey and the flower of his soldiers, where the fate of the day was to be decided. Crastinus had therefore reached the topmost round of promotion in the career of the common soldier when his term of service expired. As head centurion of the tenth legion he had commanded directly the whole manipule of the Pilani,

¹ The reading suggested for the corrupt *et ius* of the Mss. by Schenkl, Philol. 28, p. 115.

² The lines of distinction between these words were probably not yet sharply drawn. *Evocati* is used technically only once in Caesar's B. G., vii. 65. 5, and the soldiers designated can hardly have been other than *emeriti*, *voluntarii*. For the introduction in Caesar's time of this technical use of the word *evocati*, to meet a new feature in military service, see Schmidt, Hermes, xiv. pp. 328 f., 352. It is found only six times in Caesar's B. C.

the body forming the front and right of the first cohort in the front line of battle.¹ His hortatory speech, beginning, "Sequitur me, manipulares mei qui fuistis," was addressed to this body of soldiers on the extreme right of the front line of battle, who stood nearest him, but no longer directly under his command. Their courageous advance was sure to be closely imitated by the whole cohort, legion, and line.

But Crastinus, at the extreme right of the first line of battle, was not alone, nor acting under any mere roving commission. His charge was not a hastily conceived and impulsive deed, but one which Caesar had, in all probability, commissioned him to make. The hundred and twenty picked soldiers (*electi milites*) who immediately followed him as he dashed forward from the right wing (*primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit*), were not his old manipulars. This would have thrown the whole battle array of the tenth legion into confusion, and produced a straggling skirmish attack; whereas we know that Caesar's whole line advanced evenly, halted midway to take breath when Pompey's lines were seen to remain stationary, and then renewed the charge (Caes. B. C. iii. 93. 1). Caesar had long surmised that Pompey would make the struggle depend on his ability to turn his enemy's right wing with his enormous body of cavalry. Caesar had therefore taken special precautions to strengthen this right wing. Two of these precautions he mentions. One was to re-enforce his own small body of cavalry with picked infantrymen (c. 84. 3-5). A second was to put his best legion, the tenth, where Pompey's special attack was to fall (c. 89. 1). A third precaution he does not specifically mention, but our episode shows what it was. Next to the extreme front and right cohort of the tenth legion he had commissioned Crastinus to stand, at the head of a hundred and twenty *voluntarii* like himself (*voluntarii eiusdem centuriae*), and had ordered him, as soon as the battle signal should be given, to lead these veterans in a special charge before the regular line of battle, to inspire thus the whole line to make a bolder attack, and to throw the enemy's extreme left into some confusion before the tenth

¹ Göler, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 228, § 27.

legion should reach and rout it. Even if Pompey's cavalry had succeeded, then, in overwhelming Caesar's smaller troop of horsemen, they would have been recalled from any attempt to follow up their advantage and turn Caesar's flank, by the discomfiture of the left wing of Pompey's infantry. This third precaution may well have been determined upon some days before the battle, during the preliminary manœuvres described in c. 84. The fact that Crastinus had received this special commission, whose tactical importance he would perfectly understand, makes the colloquy between him and his general, as the army drew out of camp, and Caesar's question how the prospects appeared to him, perfectly natural, as well as the vow of the veteran that his general's confidence should not appear to have been misplaced. Caesar omits to mention this colloquy, as foreign to the purpose with which he gives the episode, and possibly transfers the vow which immediately followed it to the close of the centurion's harangue to those soldiers of the tenth legion standing nearest him. The words *voluntarii eiusdem centuriae*, then, are added to explain specifically the indefinite *electi milites*,¹ and are to be rendered "*voluntarii* of the same troop," i. e. of the same troop as Crastinus, the troop which he now specially commanded, in distinction from his old manipulars of the tenth legion, whom he calls upon to follow him. They were to follow, not in the forlorn-hope charge of the *voluntarii* (*prosecuti*), but in the regular advance of the whole line, and could feel sure of finding gaps in the front of the enemy's left when they got there.

This interpretation calls for a brief comment on the use of the word *centuria*. It no longer denoted, except in very rare cases,² one of the two platoons of the manipule. For this the technical term was *ordo*.³ *Centuria*, like our *troop* or *company*, could still be used of any considerable body of men

¹ Willmann, *op. cit.*, considers "*electi milites*" a special technical designation, like *voluntarii*, or *evocati*. This is certainly not Caesar's usage even of *electi* alone.

² B. C. i. 64. 4, 76. 3, and this passage, exhaust the possible cases in Caesar, and even in the first two the word may be used in a general rather than a technical sense. See Willmann, and cf. Marquardt, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 334.

³ Rüstow, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

outside the regular legion formation of about the size of a maniple (*circiter* cxx), and is probably so used here. That this *centuria* contained no more than one hundred and twenty men cannot be positively decided from the language of Caesar (*voluntarii eiusdem centuriae*). Bearing in mind, however, the shortness of Caesar's military career (p. 52), and also the fact that his legionaries numbered hardly half those of Pompey, viz. twenty-two thousand to forty-five thousand (cc. 88, 89), one hundred and twenty need not seem altogether improbable as representing the whole number of Caesar's *evocati* (*voluntarii*), even over against Pompey's two thousand. Besides, we have the repeated testimony of Plutarch that Crastinus commanded one hundred and twenty men (p. 47). But it does not necessarily follow that Caesar massed all his *evocati* (*voluntarii*) under Crastinus. Such an inference from his so prominently mentioning the fact that Pompey scattered his own *evocati* all along his line of battle (c. 88. 5) is at best uncertain.

The bearing of this view of the commission of Crastinus on the question what the *antesignani* were, is negative, but important. Caesar does not call the troop which Crastinus commanded *antesignani*, but *voluntarii*. So the author of the *Bellum Africanum*, in a passage cited¹ to uphold the old view that the *antesignani* were a special detached corps in each legion,² speaks not of *antesignani*, but of *expediti*, a word of as general meaning as *electi*. The new view that the *antesignani* were the four front cohorts in the legion's usual line of battle is so well upheld by Göler,³ that it is strange to find him, in his impossible interpretation of the Crastinus episode, neglecting to compare it with the exploit of the *antesignani* at Ilerda (B. C. i. 43).

3. What was the exploit of Crastinus?

It was to set an inspiring example to Caesar's whole line of battle, and especially to the tenth legion, on whose suc-

¹ Jähns, in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, 1881, ii. p. 208. See also, *ibid.*, the summary of Planer's "Caesars Antesignanen."

² Marquardt, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 343.

³ *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 37, note 4.

cess the fate of the day had been made to depend, by leading a large body of re-enlisted veterans in such a fierce charge upon the enemy's extreme left that it was thrown into some confusion, and would have been easily driven back when the shock of the onset of the regular line came, had not Crastinus fallen. Caesar had planned the movement as one of three precautionary measures which should frustrate Pompey's known design of turning his right wing. These measures would probably all have proved in vain, had it not been for a fourth precaution, which seems to have flashed into Caesar's mind at the last moment. Pompey concentrated even more strength upon his left wing than Caesar had anticipated (c. 88, *fin.*). Fearing then the certain defeat of his own cavalry in spite of the fact that they had been strengthened by infantrymen, in which case everything would have depended upon the success of Crastinus and the tenth legion, Caesar formed the famous *quarta acies*, which, in concert with his cavalry, crushed so utterly the hopes of Pompey (c. 89. 4; 93. 5-8). But even when this *quarta acies*, after routing the cavalry of Pompey, had fallen in one and the same charge (*eodem impetu*) upon the rear of his infantry left, this was still holding its ground bravely against the tenth legion (*pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistentibus*). Crastinus had fallen. Pompey's left had fought better than Caesar had thought they could against his favorite tenth legion, even after a path had been opened up for it into the enemy's ranks by the *voluntarii*; but when the cavalry of Pompey scurried off to the hills, and Caesar's *quarta acies* fell upon the rear of Pompey's left wing, the death of Crastinus and the failure of his exploit to accomplish all that had been intended by it were more than made good. Pompey's left wing broke and fled; and now Caesar ordered up his reserves, the *tertia acies*, when Pompey's whole line followed the shattered left wing. Caesar had not merely foiled the tactics of his enemy, but turned them back upon him with complete success. As Florus so well puts it (ii. 13 [= iv. 2], 47): "Sed nec minus admirabilior illius exitus belli. Quippe cum Pompeius adeo equitum copia abundaret, ut facile circumventurus sibi Caesarem videretur, circumventus ipse est."

Very discriminating is Caesar's estimate of his obligations for this victory ; first and foremost, the *quarta acies* : "Neque vero Caesarem fefellit quin ab iis cohortibus quae contra equitatum in quarta acie collocatae essent initium victoriae oriretur" (c. 94. 3). But to Crastinus, even though only partially successful, he gives that praise for which the veteran was willing to die : "Sic enim Caesar existimabat, eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse, optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat."